Understanding the futility of Sepp Blatter's promise of reforms in FIFA

FIFA President Sepp Blatter wants to portray himself as one of the good guys trying to save FIFA

The dramatic incident that delayed the FIFA press conference in Zurich last Monday served to reinforce our memory of the ethical bankruptcy of football’s international governing body. An English comedian, Simon Brodkin, was escorted outside FIFA premises and arrested by Swiss police for showering $600 on Blatter; cheekily adding that it represented his bid for the 2026 World Cup to be held in North Korea.

It is still a mystery how Blatter, who was visibly rattled by what had transpired, delivered this absolute gem while keeping a perfectly straight face before walking out the room:

“Ladies and gentlemen, we have to clean here first. Otherwise I will not be able to talk to you about football.”

You’d struggle to guess if he was referring to the notes strewn all around him, or FIFA itself. When he returned a few minutes later, the first words he uttered were consistent with the nonsensical drivel we’ve grown so used to hearing from him.

“I just called my late mother,” he told the journalists, presumably referring to the bizarre prank, “and she said, ‘don’t worry, it’s just the lack of education.” While that may be the case, for Blatter to make a moral argument given his central position in the recent $150 million scandal, was ironic.

Sepp finally announced that he will indeed step down as FIFA President on 26th Feb 2016, although, as always, he didn’t pass up the opportunity to portray the resignation as something of a heroic sacrifice on his part: “I had to do something very special and I did it. In footballing terms, I would say I kicked the ball out of the field to stop something, this is what I did.”

The main agenda for the extraordinary Congress that preceded the press conference was the rebirth of a “reform process” that had concluded in 2013 and was labeled a success.

Blatter revealed he was “very happy” with the decisions taken by the Executive Committee in the meeting: “We have taken a combined resolution that we want to again go into a reform process.”

For those who may not remember, FIFA buried its reform committee (2011-2013; more on that in the coming paragraphs) and its reports following a clear majority arrived at by the heads of the confederations during the 2013 general assembly.

He now wants to revive that farce and give it a makeover by assigning an eleven member “taskforce” to carry out the process. The key measures introduced by FIFA as part of its “new” reform process include term limits for executives, disclosure of payments to other parties, and centralized integrity checks, all of which were rejected, either wholly or in part, during the first reform process.

Although FIFA may appear serious now, we’ve been in similar situations enough times in the past to know that it’s not likely to significantly change anything for the better. Recent history too is littered with incidents that only raise questions about FIFA’s ability and integrity to reform itself.

Reluctance to implement proposals of governance experts

It would be foolish to believe Blatter when after all that’s happened in the last few years.

In 2013, FIFA critic and political scientist Roger Pielke, Jr. wrote a paper (PDF) in which he assessed the then concluded reform process. He found in his research that there was a total of 59 recommended proposals to FIFA in three independent reports submitted by – Mark Pieth (2011), Transparency International (a Berlin based non-profit organization) (2011), and the Independent Governance Committee (2013).

Of the 59 recommendations, Pielke finds that only 7 were implemented in totality, while 10 were implemented partially, and 42 were not implemented at all. A reasonable inference that may be drawn from this is that FIFA was cherry-picking among reform proposals, implementing only those that would further its own interests.

As Pielke writes: A precondition for a successful advisory process is a commitment from the organization receiving the advice to actually hear what relevant, independent experts have to say.

The FIFA reform process, however, was managed from inside the organization, blunting both the advice that was eventually given and the potential to clearly evaluate FIFA’s commitment to reform.

“Independence”

A report on FIFA Governance submitted by governance expert Mark Pieth (who had previously advised large international organizations like the United Nations) in 2011 looked like the real deal until his credibility nosedived after it was revealed that he was receiving a $128,000 fee plus $5,000 every day from FIFA for producing his report.

The problem wasn’t so much that he was getting paid as it was FIFA’s blatant non-disclosure of the fact. Ironically, Pieth’s report even highlighted the need for a strong policy on conflict of interests which includes disclosure of financial relationships between parties: “…conflicts cannot be forbidden; conflicts are a reason to notify and disclose the situation, and to recuse one-self in substantial cases.” Yet there was no disclosure to this effect in the 29-page report.

Now let’s take a look at the Independent Governance Committee (IGC), which Pieth went on to chair shortly after submitting his first report. The IGC comprised of 12 members, only two of whom were independent; four appeared to be independent but had not disclosed their financial relationship with FIFA, and the remaining six were clearly not independent.

Obviously, if at least 50% of the committee was under the payroll of FIFA, there arises a perceived conflict of interests that immediately casts a doubt over the integrity of the operation, especially given FIFA’s iniquitous reputation.

In the context of governance, a person (or an association of persons) may be considered independent of FIFA (or any other organization) if they are neither directly nor indirectly related to FIFA (/other organization) so that they are free from outside influences that could potentially impair their judgment.

Pieth’s secretive financial relationship with FIFA creates a perceived conflict of interests that does not qualify him as independent. The IGC, too, is ruled out simply by virtue of being constituted by FIFA. By that precedent, so is the 11-member task force that has replaced the now-defunct IGC.

Blatter, of course, maintains that this will be a neutral body; but his idea of an “independent personality” to head this team is Domenico Scala, who is already the chairman of two FIFA committees.

I’d argue that its decision to appoint someone from within (again!) to clean up its mess presumes a sense of guilt on the part of its leadership. I also believe that one would be forgiven for assuming that no one tied with FIFA can truly be independent of its influence.

In the words of campaign group New FIFA Now’s Jamie Fuller:

“The cynical attempts to portray this ridiculous plan as having any semblance of independence should not be a surprise to anyone after the litany of previous efforts to pull the wool over everyone’s eyes.”

The futility of the 2011 reforms

Just over a month before the IGC was due to submit its final report in 2013, Alexandra Wrage, a governance expert who was one of the two independent members of the IGC, resigned.

She later said: “It’s been the least productive project I’ve ever been involved in.” Transparency International (TI) had severed ties with FIFA much earlier (in 2011). Their relationship had already turned sour because FIFA rejected 22 of 26 recommendations put forward by TI in its first report.

But it was the news of FIFA’s payments to Pieth that tipped the anti-corruption organization over the edge. Sylvia Schenk, senior adviser for sport with TI, said that their organization turned down an invitation to join FIFA’s outside governance committee because of the nondisclosure of the payments to Pieth which they believed compromised his independence.

More recently, FIFA appointed American lawyer Michael Garcia in 2012 to investigate the alleged illegal payments made by FIFA marketing company International Sport and Leisure (ISL) to former FIFA President Havelange.

Upon finding certain inconsistencies, Garcia decided to extend his investigation to the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. His findings were released by FIFA judge Hans-Joachim Eckert as a 42-page summary of a report that was originally 430 pages long.

This summary was publicly disowned by Garcia, who resigned a day after his appeal against the interpretation of the original document was rejected. He even said that he had completely lost confidence in Eckert’s independence.

The 2022 Qatar World Cup bid controversy

FIFA whistle-blower Phaedra Al-Majid’s case was arguably the most damning. In 2011, Al-Majid, who worked as an international media officer for the Qatar 2022 bid team, alleged that Qatari officials offered to buy the votes of three FIFA members, hoping to win the bid to host the 2022 World Cup (which they did).

Later that year, she withdrew her statement. After the falling out between Fifa and Garcia, she once again spoke out, claiming she was coerced into retracting her claims in 2011. She added: “FIFA’s rules are a farce. Not even an extensive, purportedly independent, two-year investigation and report could affect its culture.”

It would be foolish to believe Blatter when, after all that’s happened in the last few years, he comes out and promises more reform. The way I see it, it’s just a clever ploy to depict himself as one of the good guys: the reformist who “tried his best” to rescue a sinking ship in his final lap as FIFA president.

The reality is that during his presidency, FIFA has witnessed, among numerous allegations of corruption, the worst ever scandal in its 111-year-old history. Now, while it cannot be said with certainty that a change in leadership will make institutional reform more likely, logic dictates that giving those under suspicion of grave ethical and legal violations a say in the reform process is hardly the way to move forward; true reform, therefore, can only be ensured (a) in Blatter’s absence, and (b) if it is entrusted to a genuinely independent body as opposed to an ad hoc committee set up by the very organization that is under investigation.