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One of the most fascinating rivalries in recent football has been the one between Jurgen Klopp and Pep Guardiola. This rivalry is based not so much on the accumulation of silverware as it is about tactical nous and footballing philosophies.
During his time at Barcelona from 2008 to 2012, Guardiola practiced and perfected the art of tiki-taka, a style of possession-based football based on the founding philosophies of Johan Cruyff’s Total Football, which in itself was a refinement from the model set up by Rinus Michels. Guardiola’s tiki-taka is based on passing and movement, usually comprising a series of short passes in an attempt to find gaps in the opposition defence.
Like Total Football that required players to be able to play a wide range of roles, Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona also had a team of La Masia-trained footballers who could seamlessly fit into multiple positions. For example, in the 2009 UEFA Champions League final, a central midfielder, Yaya Toure played as a makeshift centre-back, while the usual centre-back Carles Puyol played at right-back. That effectively kept the dangerous Cristiano Ronaldo at bay, to the point where the Portuguese, so frustrated at being caged, shoved Puyol at the advertisement hoardings at the corner flag near the end of the game.
Guardiola also assembled a team that had great technical ability on the ball, coupled with an impeccable sense of decision-making during the final-third of the pitch. This meant that the Barcelona strikers would often pass the ball to another teammate, even when there was an opportunity to have a pop at goal. The aim was to pass the ball to the right player at the right time to an unmarked teammate to ensure the best probability of scoring a goal.
With players like Lionel Messi, Guardiola also had someone who could manoeuvre his own space by simply dribbling the ball away from tight spaces. This dribbling ability also came in handy when destabilising opponent’s defensive structures.
However, one of the most overlooked aspects of Guardiola’s teams, including that famous all-conquering Barcelona side, was how Guardiola’s football is based on achieving a certain rhythm of passing. When we talk about tiki-taka, we refer to keeping ball possession and finding space in behind the defence.
However, what makes tiki-taka tick is the rhythm at which the ball is passed, and how much time a player has on the ball. In other words, tiki-taka thrives not merely on passing but on passing at the right rhythm. Simply holding on to the ball by passing it around is not tiki-taka.
All teams have to pass the ball to play football, but that does not mean that they adopt the tiki-taka method. This style requires passing with a certain purpose – not simply to find spaces to exploit in the opponent’s defence, but also to pass the ball at a certain tempo. That tempo is achieved by maintaining a passing rhythm, which in turn is possible when players enjoy time on the ball to make decisions.
How Pep Guardiola's tiki-taka can be countered:
The most effective way to counter Guardiola's tiki-taka is to not let his teams build the desired rhythm in their game. Jose Mourinho of course understood this, and part of his plan during those four El Clasicos in 2011 was to create a stop-start experience for Barcelona, to disrupt the flow of the game in order to hinder the creation of that rhythmic passing.
This was also coupled with intimidation-tactics: fouling Lionel Messi, stepping on to his hand, grabbing him by the hair, the introduction of Emanuel Adebayor to add a physical presence up front in order to rile the Barcelona defenders. In fact, during the first leg of that year’s Champions League semi-final, the first notable contribution of Adebayor after coming on as a substitute was to scratch Puyol in the face.
This was one in a series of tactics that Mourinho employed to counter Guardiola. A year back, in 2010, Mourinho’s Inter had successfully managed to knock Barcelona out of the Champions League by putting a large number of players inside and around their own penalty box in the return leg at the Nou Camp. The press called it Park-the-Bus.
This ultra-defensive strategy meant that Guardiola’s team could not find spaces at the back to exploit. This restricted Barcelona’s attacking prowess and forced them into taking shots from long range, where the probability of scoring is considerably reduced. Pique did get a goal back but it was too late for Barcelona to stage a comeback. Barcelona did win on the night but they lost out on aggregate.
That match also revealed another weakness in Guardiola’s game: that is, his teams’ inability to win games by smash-and-grab. Guardiola’s tactic is effective, but it is also narrow and one-dimensional. If teams can find a way to thwart Barcelona’s rhythmic passing, Barcelona can be thwarted altogether.
The same logic applies to Guardiola's Manchester City team, as it did during the Spanish mananger's stint at Bayern Munich. Every football match has its own patterns, and coaches often have to make certain tactical tweaks during a game to address the need of the hour.
Guardiola’s teams, however, do not know any other way of playing. Even when there is no space to be had, they continue passing and probing, playing in the same manner that may have proved ineffective for the previous eighty-eight minutes. Other teams would at that point, perhaps attempt to be more direct, play a long ball upfront. But Guardiola’s teams do not play that way.
They will still try to build their rhythm and attempt to find gaps in the opponent’s penalty box. It requires a tremendous amount of discipline to be able to do that. Many players would just lose patience and have a wild go at goal. But the Barcelona midfielders seldom chose that option.
In fact, it is a bad signal for Guardiola’s teams to be taking shots from long distance, and a complement to the opposing defenders and a testament to their defensive shape. Therefore, all these factors underline the importance of rhythm in Guardiola’s footballing system. Defending in large numbers and stopping the flow of his teams’ passing are the two key methods to stop Guardiola's tiki-taka.
Many coaches have perfected the art of making their teams defend in large numbers, Mourinho being a prime example. However, it is with the other part where coaches, even Mourinho, have struggled with: stopping Guardiola’s teams' passing rhythm.
Repeated fouling cannot be an effective strategy because it puts the whole team in danger of getting booked and sent off. Mourinho’s Real Madrid players have been sent-off many times by the referee while employing this method. This brings us to the inevitable conclusion that an effective pressing strategy has to be used in order to disrupt Guardiola’s teams' rhythmic passing.
Pressing is a defensive strategy in which players quickly try to close down an opponent player who has the ball by forcing him to make a quick, and hopefully, panicked decision. This makes opponent players susceptible to mistakes, which often leads to misplaced passes, resulting in a turnover of possession.
Guardiola himself developed an effective pressing strategy during his tenure at Barcelona, where he famously started the ‘Six-second’ rule. In this method, Guardiola’s players, when they lost possession of the ball, would press the player with the ball and try to win it back within six seconds. A strategy of collective pressure was applied. All the passing lanes were closed so that the opposition player on the ball often played the ball straight at the feet of a Barcelona player.
The art of pressing has evolved through the years. Before the 1960s, footballers had a lot of time on the ball. The game was slow, and players would hold on to the ball to stand and think before making a pass. This happened even in a congested space such as the midfield where players usually have little time on the ball today. Jonathan Wilson observes in his book Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics:
"Watch the Hungarians of the fifties or the Brazilians of the sixties, and what is noticeable to the modern eye is how long players have on the ball… It is simply that nobody closes them down. A player receiving the ball had time to assess his options. The dribbling ability of Garrincha or Stanley Matthews doesn’t exist in today’s game, not because the skills have been lost, but because no side would ever give them the three or four yards of acceleration room they need before their feints became effective." (Wilson, 2014, pp. 180-181)
In fact, Guardiola’s Barcelona were so effective both in attack and defence that Sir Alex Ferguson wrote in his autobiography about the two Champions League finals in 2009 and 2011:
"Barcelona were the best team ever to line up against my Manchester United sides. Easily the best." (Sir Alex Ferguson, 2014, p. 263)
Later, Ferguson also acknowledged Guardiola’s method of pressing and the role it played in Barcelona’s success:
"The basis of their philosophy was laid down by Johann Cruyff… What Guardiola added was a method of pressing the ball. Under Pep, they had this three-second drill, apparently, where the defending team would be allowed no more than three seconds on the ball." (Ferguson, 2014, pp. 267-268)
Jurgen Klopp's system of play:
While Guardiola uses pressing as a secondary defensive tactic, one manager would go on to base his whole idea of football on this simple, yet effective system: Jurgen Klopp. In a way, Klopp has refined the art of pressing and has advanced this aspect of the beautiful game.
During his time in the Bundesliga with Borussia Dortmund, Klopp developed the Gegenpressing, a unique press-based system that prioritised winning the ball further up the pitch, close to the opponents’ goal. Klopp believes that your chances of scoring are maximised the closer you win the ball to your opponents’ goal.
Klopp's players take pressing not as a secondary defensive system, but as a priority whenever the ball is lost. Teams who employ Gegenpressing cover every blade of grass because winning the ball by putting pressure on the player who has the ball is instrumental to the system's success.
Therefore, while for Guardiola rhythmic passing and extensive build-up play is important, Klopp prefers to score quick, counter-attack style goals where the opposition does not get enough time to organise their backline after ceding possession. While Guardiola prefers order and rhythm, Klopp thrives in creating chaos and confusion for his opponents.
This is done mainly through the setting up of defensive traps in the middle of the pitch which is a common routine of teams employing the Gegenpressing as a primary tactic. However, this is not to say that Klopp’s teams cannot pass the ball themselves, or that they are incapable of scoring team goals.
In fact, Klopp’s Liverpool have devised ingenious supply routes through their two full-backs, Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold. Their balls into the box create a plethora of scoring opportunities for Liverpool’s three forward players. It is just that they are more prone to forcing the opposition into making a mistake and then benefitting from the gaps left by them.
Passing the ball is not their go-to strategy, or at least not as much as it is preferred by Guardiola. Pressing is not just a defensive system for Klopp; it is used to initiate attacks and also features during defensive play. For Klopp, the act of collective pressing can be regarded as the first movement of attack.
It is a form of attacking without the ball before attacking with the ball. His teams retain an attacking mentality even before the ball is won. Klopp’s teams never defend, but they attack in defence. Most importantly, his teams attack the opponents’ minds by forcing them into making mistakes.
Klopp finds order in chaos while Guardiola dislikes chaos of any kind. The former has created a system that feeds hungrily on misplaced passes; the latter, although has a good pressing strategy of his own, prefers a more possession-oriented approach. Guardiola’s full-backs seldom put crosses into the box, while Klopp’s full-backs have even assisted each other in goal-scoring.
Height also plays an important role in Klopp choosing a player. A Jurgen Klopp team is more likely to score a headed goal from a corner, cross or free kick than a Pep Guardiola side. This is mainly because of the type of players the two managers prefer.
When choosing a player to sign, Guardiola prioritises a player’s technical ability on the ball: his range of passing, ball distribution and decision-making abilities. The Catalan usually overlooks a player’s physical strength and height.
That is not to say that these attributes are not important for Guardiola. It is just that his record shows that he prefers to sign players such as Bernardo Silva, Sergio Busquets, Gerard Pique and Thiago Alcantara. Of course, he also signed Yaya Toure, whose physical strength or height cannot be questioned. Yet, during his tenure at Barcelona, he preferred to start with Busquets in the defensive midfield position, and the Ivory Coast man was forced to play second-fiddle to his less-muscular counterpart.
The core of Guardiola’s successful Barcelona side consisted of players such as Xavi Hernandez, Andres Iniesta, Lionel Messi, Sergio Busquets, Pedro Rodriguez and others who were not the strongest of players in terms of physical strength, or the tallest in terms of physical height. But they were probably the most technically gifted players of their time.
Guardiola wants a player to have flair and finesse on the ball. The prospective player should be comfortable with the ball at his feet. His defenders always have the ability to play the ball out from the back. He ensures that they do, or he replaces them with players who can perform this task.
Guardiola perhaps understood the necessity of also having strength and height in the squad, which may have prompted him to buy Zlatan Ibrahimovic as a forward in the summer of 2010, after the all-conquering, sextuple-winning campaign. But that was more of an afterthought, a valuable addition to an already talented side bristling with confidence. It was also an attempt to make his team more dynamic and multi-dimensional, to make his outfit less predictable.
Klopp, although, would obviously prefer and want technically gifted players, nevertheless he likes them to be robust and physically imposing. He prefers box-to-box midfielders because their stamina ensures that they carry out his energy-sapping instructions to the minutest detail.
Klopp’s choice of players at Liverpool such as James Milner, Georginio Wijnaldum, Sadio Mane, Fabinho, Virgil Van Dijk and others show that he likes working with robust and physically strong players. Of course, Klopp also had Mario Goetze, Shinji Kagawa, Marco Reus at Dortmund and has Mohammed Salah at Liverpool. They are not the strongest of players physically, with one of them being greatly injury-prone.
Yet, a considerable bulk of Klopp's players are known for their strength, stamina and fitness. Klopp prefers players who have the ability to work hard off-the-ball and cover every blade of grass. Strong players will emerge on top during the process of ball-winning, a vital ingredient in the Gegenpressing system.
A fitter squad will be able to outrun and outlast a weaker opposition, a sight that was in full display during Liverpool’s famous comeback against Ernesto Valverde’s Barcelona in the Champions League semi-final second leg last season. That night, Barcelona were not only outplayed, but they were also incapable of matching Liverpool’s physical prowess.
Klopp likes his players to be always hungry to win the ball. During possession, his players keep the ball mainly by switching it to the flanks and creating quick chances near the opposition box with incisive through passes. Their build-up play is neither exhaustive nor elaborate; they are comfortable in taking shots from distance, as demonstrated by Fabinho during a match against Manchester City when he scored a spectacular opening goal in controversial circumstances.
Unlike Guardiola, Klopp does not ask his players to retain the ball indefinitely. He is much more willing to take his chances from far out. Unlike Guardiola's, Klopp’s teams are happy to score a scrappy goal and do not wait for the perfect opportunity to arise. Klopp prefers to play a more physical game when and if possible.
This does not mean committing more fouls or showing a lack of discipline. Rather, Klopp wants his players to win possession back with superior ball-winning and tackling abilities. His teams, especially Liverpool, are always looking to physically impose their authority in the game.
Guardiola, on the other hand, tries to keep a monopoly over the ball by dominating the opposition with superior technical ability, better first touch and a wide array of passing. This is however a difficult skill to master and execute, especially when pressed hard by the other team.
Guardiola and Klopp are like fire and ice; their approach to the game is diametrically opposite to one another, almost as if one is always scheming to nullify the other. Their rivalry, at least from a tactical standpoint, is as intriguing as the ones between Arsene Wenger and Alex Ferguson, or between Rafael Benitez and Jose Mourinho.
Both of them use the same materials, but employ them differently. Guardiola deliberately wants to cater to a style of football that is free-flowing and entertaining to watch. Klopp does not deliberately tweak his tactics to make his football more entertaining, and yet it is just as fun and interesting to watch his teams in action.
The rivalry between the two coaches in the Premier League is healthy for the progress of football tactics. It ensures that we have tactically gruelling games to look forward to: a chance to refine and reshape the already known dimensions of football tactics and an opportunity to expand our own footballing nous and strategic acumen.
The modern footballing landscape has undergone seismic shifts and changes in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and the recent addition of this new rivalry in the English game is ultimately good for the sport. For now, Guardiola leads Klopp in silverwares won, but with the German poised to win Liverpool's first Premier League title in thirty years, only time will tell what legacies they leave behind.
