Andre Villas Boas and the Tottenham transition

Bale’s playing style at that time was summed up by a game that was probably the highlight of his career, a 4-3 defeat against Inter Milan. After Spurs found themselves 4-0 down at half time, he produced a master class, scoring three times against one of the best right backs at that time, a tireless engine called Maicon. His willingness to run directly and fearlessly at the defender, trailblazing pace and excellent technique all shone brightly in all three goals, and he was now on his way to becoming one of the best players in the world.

Redknapp used Bale as a strictly left sided player in a rigid 4-4-1-1, supported in the centre by the distribution of Luka Modric and Aaron Lennon on the other wing. Rafael van der Vaart played behind the lone forward, linking the defence to attack smoothly with his intelligent movement and passing. Little did Redknapp know that the formation restricted Bale’s actual potential, as Van der Vaart’s presence in the middle constrained Bale onto the wings, and drifting into the centre left the wing exposed. Also, if Bale did drift inside, it would leave him, Van der Vaart, Modric, Parker and Crouch/Defoe/Adebayor in the centre, in essence congesting the centre of the pitch.

To solve this dual conundrum of lack of freedom to Gareth Bale and the flawed dynamics of the Redknapp system, AVB experimented with a variety of options. He recognised the two inherent flaws in the side – one, that Bale’s accurate shooting and blistering pace were being underutilized on the left wing, and two, that if Bale was brought into the centre, Tottenham’s tactical shape and balance collapsed, as Bale became more of an inside forward/support striker, which also disrupted Van Der Vaart’s not-so-versatile playing style.

So Villas Boas started by restructuring his team altogether, and this new phase of Tottenham’s evolution was marked by the departures of arguably two of their most influential and important players – Luka Modric and Rafael Van der Vaart. AVB decided to fill those vacancies by buying three players with very different playing styles – Moussa Dembele, an attacking midfielder (a position that cannot be used in a 4-4-2), Clint Dempsey and Icelandic midfielder Gylfi Sigurdsson.

AVB started the season by playing a 4-2-3-1, using Bale as a left sided attacking midfielder, which was a more advanced position than his left midfielder position under Redknapp. Sandro’s defensive resilience and Dembele’s ability to silkily bring the ball forward both helped in restoring the balance in Tottenham’s formation as well as giving Bale an added measure of freedom.

But as the season went by, Clint Dempsey’s less than satisfactory displays in centre attacking midfield and Sigurdsson’s inability to adapt to Tottenham’s system forced AVB to change the system once again. Instead of reverting back to the 4-4-1-1, AVB switched to a 4-4-2, putting Defoe and Adebayor up top. This meant that Bale was now back to his left midfield role, but the lack of an attacking midfielder allowed him the liberty to cut inside at will. The lack of coordination between Adebayor and Defoe led to yet another failed formation, but AVB’s decision to let Bale use the centre worked well.

He capitalised on the benefits of that move, shunting Bale inside, and asking Gylfi Sigurdson to move on to the outside. This resulted in Bale’s finest run of form, as he went on to score 11 times (assisting 4) in 13 games. But this system too had its limitations. Bale could easily be crowded out by committing bodies in the centre. Also, Bale’s shift towards the centre meant that AVB could no longer shift to a 4-3-3 during games, a formation he has been fond of since his days at Porto.

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