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Eight knockout games later, we’re left with the best eight at Euro 2020. Indeed, what a round of matches that was, littered with remarkable comebacks, astonishing goals and records being set and smashed. The footballing extravaganza at Euro 2020 has finally kicked off, and the joys of the beautiful game are on an unapologetic exhibition, in all its unpredictable, resplendent glory.
Given the inherently chaotic nature of tournament football, it is only natural that those with a vested interest - managers and coaches - seek control and try to ensure their teams hold their fort. It is this attitude that realizes itself in the cloak of pragmatism that teams in the knockout stages are generally draped with. Some of the scorelines, however, bely any hint of pragmatism that may have seeped into the Euro 2020 Round of 16 matches.
Euro 2020: The Prevalence of the Three-man Defense
Almost half the teams involved in the Euro 2020 Round of 16 started their matches with an additional defender in a back three, with two wide wingbacks adorning the flanks. When out of possession, the wingbacks switched the back three into an impenetrable quintet.
The continued rise of the three-man defense as a viable structure has meant teams and players are well-versed in the strategy. It has become increasingly apparent not just in the club game, but in international matches as well. Indeed, it is worth considering how a system at one point so synonymous with Italian football and its school of organized defending, has lent itself to the whole continent and its larger footballing ecosystem.
The phenomenon was typified at Euro 2020 by teams such as Germany, England and France, who all departed from the tried-and-tested combination of two central defenders and two full backs. Instead, they reverted to a back three for the first knockout round at the Euros. The results were decidedly mixed.
But why switch in the first place? What does one risk by hopping onto the back three bandwagon? The answers were scattered across games at Euro 2020.
Firstly, an additional central defender at the expense of a midfielder has the potential to cause a team to drop back further into a lower block. This is simply because a presser in the middle third has been replaced by another central defender.
Now, this may not always be the case, but teams that play with a back three and are press high generally do so through three compartments across the field. The system involves a fluid and ferocious frontline, high wing backs and, importantly, midfielders who are disciplined in shape while simultaneously being able recyclers of possession. Chelsea men’s teams of 2016-17 and particularly of 2021 are two excellent examples of this setup.
But possession domination and a co-ordinated press despite a numerically disadvantaged midfield comes from regular training and match practice. International football, particularly in tournaments such as Euro 2020, rarely allows for that. Hence, a team that generally plays a back three in an international tournament is one that may have the personnel to dominate possession and win the ball high up. But they are also structurally set-up to be able to sit deep and absorb pressure.
In the Euro 2020 knockouts, Belgium switched to a back three against Portugal, Switzerland played a back three against world champions France and both England and Germany deployed the same structure. All these teams probably made the call with this in mind, expecting tight, cagey games, where the need for an extra midfield presser was perhaps not needed as much as that of an additional defender.
Indeed, Belgium and Portugal played out a remarkably tight Euro 2020 fixture, separated by a wonderful Thorgan Hazard strike. England against Germany also remained cagey till the deadlock was broken by Raheem Sterling in the 74th minute.
The higher caliber of opposition faced in knockout games, coupled with the heightened stakes, makes the back three a fairly tempting option. This was evident in the Euro 2020 Round of 16. The defensive blocks were lower, and the games were tighter.
The emphasis at Euro 2020 was, thus, on constructing attacks from turnovers and the wide areas. In these sections of the field, the wing-backs can play as more advanced wide attackers, knowing that their backline has added security.
Indeed, the responsibility for stretching the play falls on the shoulders of these wing-backs, and in an attack against a back four, there is generally an extra player on the other flank. This keeps a retreating defense stretched, allowing the frontline to operate in the spaces that are opened up in the opposition defensive ranks.
Robin Gosens and Joshua Kimmich dovetailed to devastating effect for Germany against Portugal in what was the most comprehensive tactical victory of Euro 2020 so far. Denzel Dumfries too offered great width and attacking verve for the Netherlands from the right.
Adrien Rabiot was often the widest player on the left side of the French attack in their Euro 2020 match against Switzerland, particularly in the first half, when France played with a back three. From that position, he made three shot creating actions despite playing out of position.
For the Swiss, Steven Zuber ensured that Benjamin Pavard’s underwhelming Euro 2020 ended prematurely, giving him a torrid time from left wing-back, which was not his natural position. He also had three shot creating actions, one of which was an assist for Haris Seferovic to open the scoring. The other Swiss wing-back, Kevin Mbabu, got the assist for Seferovic’s second, to make it 3-2. The goal was vital for Switzerland's eventual passage to the Euro 2020 quarterfinals.
Thirdly, the back three can often be effective to stop an opposition, if they have a similar structure. As explained earlier, the wing-backs hold the key in this system as they are the ones who offer support to the backline, making it a back five without possession. They also bomb forward on their flanks while in attack, transforming the attack into a quintet as well.
Neutralizing wing-backs through a traditional back four is fairly difficult and requires greater defensive support from midfield. This pegs the midfielders back, and often puts teams at a disadvantage right from the off. Therefore arises the need to fight fire with fire. An effective way to cancel out the numerical advantage the wing backs bring to the opposition is through wing-backs of your own!
Indeed, England’s switch to a back three in their Euro 2020 tie against Germany allowed Luke Shaw and Kieran Trippier to effectively play Germany’s Kimmich and Gosens out of the game. The former duo pressed high, knowing that Kyle Walker and Harry Maguire would cover the flanks for them, and also shut down crucial passing lanes down the lines. This forced the likes of Thomas Muller and Kai Havertz to operate through the middle.
England were caught out at times - the sacrificed midfielder was apparent on a couple of occasions when Havertz played a couple of fine through balls. Jordan Pickford saved the first attempt well and Muller dragged the other one tantalizingly wide. Fine margins have also consistently been at play at Euro 2020.
Indeed, this allows for a convenient segue into the possible drawbacks of the back three system. Firstly, the sacrificing of a midfielder can often mean losing some control in the middle of the pitch - a pass in between the lines needs to beat fewer midfielders for an opposition attacker to bear down on a team’s defence. The two instances where Germany could have scored in their Euro 2020 tie against England are prime examples of this. Neither Declan Rice nor Kalvin Phillips really have the capacity to dictate play, and so some control is lost.
This was also apparent in the Euro 2020 tie between Belgium and Portugal. The former, after scoring, effectively retreated into their three-at-the-back shape and refused to commit forward. They were still keeping Portugal at an arm’s distance until Kevin De Bruyne went off injured. Suddenly, Portugal seized the midfield battle entirely, further incentivized by the fact that they were chasing this Euro 2020 game. Belgium lost their command in the middle, retreated even further, and were eventually lucky that Portugal’s profligacy cost them.
The tie between Denmark and Wales was also an interesting study of losing and regaining midfield control. Denmark set up in a back three as they had done since their second game at Euro 2020, where they narrowly lost to Belgium.
Against Wales, the Danes were initially overrun in midfield. Gareth Bale often tucked in, leaving Connor Roberts haring down the wing. Aaron Ramsey found easy pass options against Delaney and Hojberg as he, Joe Allen and Joe Morrell outnumbered the Danish midfield duo. All of this enabled the Welsh to start this Euro 2020 knockout tie brightly.
However, coach Kasper Hjulmand smelt the danger and brought defender Andreas Christensen out of the defensive line and into the midfield, switching the formation from a 3-4-3 to a 4-3-3. This allowed Denmark to numerically match up to the Wales midfield in this Euro 2020 tie. The switch worked as Christensen stepped up, closed the passing lanes and pressed the Welsh midfield, which had enjoyed their time on the ball as well as options up to that point. Denmark ran out 4-0 winners to progress to the Euro 2020 quarterfinals.
Secondly, it can also be argued that the back three is a reactionary system, wherein the onus is generally on the opposition to overcommit, before one catches them out in transition and through the spaces left out wide.
Indeed, it is often a system geared towards exploiting spaces and half-spaces that a traditional 4-3-3 may not be able to. In international football, particularly with its limited preparation time, the system can be reactionary and based around counter-attacking. The Netherlands’ 5-1 win against Spain at the 2014 World Cup still remains one of the finest exhibitions of the 3-5-2 at the international level.
Spain hogged the ball but the Dutch broke forward in numbers and pressed Spain high and wide. Their three defenders at the back stepped up and covered the wide lanes left behind when the wing-backs went ahead to press.
However, the question of whether or not the system is reactionary depends on the personnel - and this is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the system.
The back three requires the right kind of personnel - it often needs a metronomic midfielder and defenders comfortable with playing the ball out from the back, and specialist wing-backs. Without these components, the back three can be made to look fairly pedestrian, as France found out in their Euro 2020 match against Switzerland.
Clement Lenglet is hardly the best ball playing defender around, and he failed to do the basics as he was beaten in the air fairly comfortably by Seferovic for the first goal. Rabiot as a wing-back may have been a hand Deschamps was forced to play, given how his primary left-backs for Euro 2020 were both injured. The Juventus man didn’t do a bad job, but he hardly carried the attacking threat a conventional wing-back would have.
Benjamin Pavard too looked leggy at right wing-back and had a torrid evening thanks to Zuber. France were not a team that was used to playing a back three, and it showed during this particular Euro 2020 tie. It took out the additional midfield passing option, which meant Antoine Griezmann had to drop deeper to collect the ball. This in turn meant that Kylian Mbappe and Karim Benzema were tightly marked, and their markers were covered too.
Despite Paul Pogba’s brilliance, France looked terribly out of sorts in the first half and recovered only when Lenglet went off for Kingsley Coman. The Bayern Munich winger was the one who stretched the Swiss defence and not Rabiot, a midfielder by trade. Coman's antics were still insufficient as France eventually exited Euro 2020 on penalties.
Euro 2020: Jury still out on the back-three system
Of the seven teams that started with a back three in their Euro 2020 knockout games, England, Belgium and Switzerland qualified for the quarterfinals. Denmark started with a back three but then switched to a back four later on during the game.
The fact that almost half the teams involved in the Euro 2020 Round of 16 decided to deploy a back three is testament to how the structure has grown in stature and popularity. It has slowly won over coaches all over the world, operating at the highest levels. The change also shows that in international knockout football, it can be a safer bet as a formation.
However, the mixed results at Euro 2020 are a reminder that at the end of the day, a formation, style and structure are only as good as the players who embody it. Without the right players, it can often be a handicap disguised as a masterstroke.
